The former leadership team of collapsed e-commerce startup Copia Global has launched two new businesses in Kenya, just months after their company shut down despite raising at least $123 million from investors.
Timothy Steel (former CEO), Michael King (former CTO), and Tracey Turner (co-founder and former executive chair) incorporated Stahili in June 2024, one month after Copia entered administration.
Business Registration Service records show Stahili is fully owned by Copia Holding Company, the US-registered entity that remains active despite Copia Global’s liquidation.
Stahili operates as a survey-rewards platform where users complete surveys and receive mobile data credits or cashback. The model targets middle- and lower-income consumers who scan QR codes, provide product feedback, and earn instant rewards.
Turner has separately co-founded Olverra, an e-commerce platform helping African artisans sell internationally, with Kenyan data engineer Vijay Otieno as CEO.
The Collapse of Copia
Copia Global raised over $123 million across seven funding rounds between 2013 and 2023, with its final $20 million injection coming in December 2023. The company served middle- and low-income households through agent-based distribution and in-house delivery networks across Kenya and briefly Uganda.
Despite the massive capital, Copia never achieved profitability in 12 years of operation. The company pursued rapid expansion over financial sustainability, a strategy that ultimately failed as operational costs mounted and fundraising became difficult.
Copia closed its Uganda office in 2023, entered voluntary administration in May 2024, and was liquidated by September.
Stahili’s Business Model
Stahili’s survey-rewards model is a clear shift from Copia’s complex logistics and inventory management. The new venture requires minimal physical infrastructure compared to Copia’s agent networks and warehouses.
That said, it’s still possible to see several sustainability challenges that will affect the new startup.
Survey platforms typically earn revenue by selling consumer data to brands or charging for market research services. Stahili’s emphasis on privacy protection may limit monetization options, creating tension between user privacy promises and business viability.
Reward platforms face high churn rates as users often participate sporadically. Mobile data rewards may provide stronger retention in Kenya’s mobile-first market, but sustainable engagement requires consistent reward value that matches user time investment.
Established players already operate in Africa’s data collection space, which means Stahili must differentiate itself beyond privacy claims, which competitors can easily replicate.
Unlike Copia’s physical expansion costs, Stahili can scale digitally. However, reward payouts scale directly with user growth, which potentially creates similar unit economics challenges that plagued Copia.
The use of Copia Holding Company to own Stahili will also raise questions about asset protection and investor recovery. While Copia Global was liquidated to settle creditor claims, the holding company structure may have shielded certain assets for redeployment in new ventures.
As of publication, the founder(s) of Stahili did not respond to requests for comment regarding Stahili’s ties to Copia Global.
Industry experts have observed financial misappropriation in Kenya’s startup ecosystem, where funding intended for scaling gets redirected.
The rapid launch of new ventures using existing corporate structures warrants scrutiny regarding proper wind-down procedures and stakeholder obligations.
Stahili’s prospects depend on execution rather than model innovation. Survey and rewards platforms can be profitable with sufficient scale and effective monetization.
However, success requires consistent brand partnerships to fund rewards, technology infrastructure that keeps operational costs low, reward structures that balance user satisfaction with business margins, and data insights valuable enough to justify brand spending.
The founders’ experience building operational scale at Copia provides relevant skills, but their track record on sustainable business models remains unproven.
Copia’s failure stemmed from basic unit economics rather than execution problems, which suggests that the team’s business judgment faces legitimate questions.
The Reality of the Kenyan Market
Kenya’s middle- and lower-income consumers have limited disposable income for discretionary spending, the same demographic challenge that constrained Copia’s growth.
While Stahili doesn’t require consumer purchases, it depends on brands willing to pay for access to this market segment.
The timing of these launches, occurring during Copia’s liquidation process, suggests either remarkable confidence or insufficient reflection on the factors that led to the previous failure.
Without clear evidence of changed approaches to business sustainability, these new ventures face similar structural challenges in Kenya’s economic environment.
Rapid pivot to new ventures following high-profile failure plays a major role in the faith investors and stakeholders place in Kenya’s startup ecosystem.
The success or failure of these new ventures will determine whether this approach comes from a legitimate learning from experience or a continuation of unsustainable business practices.
